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Abstract. Medical imaging AI systems such as disease classification
and segmentation are increasingly inspired and transformed from com-
puter vision based AI systems. Although an array of adversarial training
and/or loss function based defense techniques have been developed and
proved to be effective in computer vision, defending against adversarial
attacks on medical images remains largely an uncharted territory due to
the following unique challenges: 1) label scarcity in medical images sig-
nificantly limits adversarial generalizability of the AI system; 2) vastly
similar and dominant fore- and background in medical images make it
hard samples for learning the discriminating features between different
disease classes; and 3) crafted adversarial noises added to the entire med-
ical image as opposed to the focused organ target can make clean and
adversarial examples more discriminate than that between different dis-
ease classes. In this paper, we propose a novel robust medical imaging
AI framework based on Semi-Supervised Adversarial Training (SSAT)
and Unsupervised Adversarial Detection (UAD), followed by designing
a new measure for assessing systems adversarial risk. We systematically
demonstrate the advantages of our robust medical imaging AI system
over the existing adversarial defense techniques under diverse real-world
settings of adversarial attacks using a benchmark OCT imaging data set.
Keywords: Adversarial Training · Adversarial Samples · Robust AI
System · Medical Image Classification · OCT images
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant advancement in various
tasks of medical imaging, including pneumonia detection (X-ray) [18], early diag-
nosis of prostate cancer (MRI) [19], retina diseases classification (OCT) [3] and
nodule segmentation (CT) [17]. To deploy DNN-based AI systems to support
disease diagnosis in those clinical applications, the robustness of DNN models
increasingly arises as a great importance. Recent studies [5,24,15,14] have specifi-
cally explored the reliability of DNN models in both classification and segmenta-
tion tasks of medical imaging. They show that DNNs can suffer from significant
performance drop when predicting adversarial samples [22], which are intention-
ally crafted inputs with human imperceptible perturbations that can completely
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fool the trained DNN models. To generate adversarial samples, various types of
attacks have been proposed, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] and
its variant with stronger attacks Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13], and
optimization-based attack Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [1]. For medical imaging
segmentation tasks, Ozbulak et al. [14] propose an adaptive segmentation mask
attack (ASMA), which produces a crafted mask to fool the trained DNN model.
Such vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial samples has raised substantial safety
concerns on the deployment of medical imaging AI systems at scale.
To defend against these adversarial attacks, different strategies have been
developed. One major line of those methods is based on adversarial training
(AT)[6,25], which improves model’s adversarial robustness by augmenting the
training set with adversarial samples. However, AT for DNNs in medical imag-
ing is problematic as they are primarily designed for natural images and requires
a large labeled training set [21] whereas medical data sets are usually with a
small amount of labeled samples. Another line of efficient defense approaches
is to learn discriminative features for classifying natural and adversarial sam-
ples [2,23]. With large inter-class separability and intra-class compactness in
latent feature space, attacks with a small perturbation budget are more diffi-
cult to succeed. However, medical imaging AI systems can be more susceptible
to even benign attacks [12] since medical images are highly standardized with
well-established exposure and quality control, featuring a significant overlap in
fore- and backgrounds. As a result, a small adversarial perturbation on the en-
tire clean images can significantly distort their distribution in the latent feature
space, which can be detrimental to the model performance on clean images. As
shown in Figure 1, adversarial samples deviate significantly from the distribution
of clean samples, implying that they are out-of-distribution (OOD) hard sam-
ples for supervised classification. Consequently the accurate prediction is not
attainable yet unsupervised detection remains as a more promising path [10].
Recently several techniques are proposed to improve the effectiveness of de-
fensive methods for medical images. In segmentation tasks, He et al. [8] found
that global contexts and global spatial dependencies are effective against ad-
versarial samples, thus they propose a non-local context encoder in the medical
image segmentation system to improve adversarial robustness. In classification
tasks, Taghanaki et al. [23] use a radial basis mapping kernel to transform and
separate features on a manifold to diminish the influence of adversarial pertur-
bation. Based on features extracted from a trained DNN model, Ma et al. [12]
attempt to distinguish adversarial samples from clean ones via density estima-
tion in the subspace of deep features learned by a classification model. Although
it achieves impressive performance, the so-called ‘detection’ methods rely on
estimating the density of adversarial samples, e.g., via local [11] or Bayesian un-
certainty [4] approaches, consequently the effectiveness is limited to the attack
methods that are previously seen.
In order to train the AI system with a small set of labeled images to im-
prove adversarial robustness against unseen and heterogeneous attacks, instead
of performing supervised adversarial training, we take a different perspective via
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unsupervised detection of adversarial samples without the need for estimating
density of the adversarial samples. We present a hybrid approach that enhances
DNN defensive power using semi-supervised adversarial training (SSAT) and
unsupervised adversarial detection (UAD). Specifically, we utilize both labeled
and unlabeled data to generate psudo-labels for SSAT to improve the robustness
of class prediction. To mitigate the distribution distortion of unseen adversar-
ial samples, we employ UAD to screen out the OOD adversarial samples in an
effort to facilitate the correct prediction of in-distribution adversarial samples
by model enhanced with SSAT (Figure 1). Our method is tailor-designed for
classifying medical imaging data sets with a limited number of labels and can
robustly defend against various unseen attacks.
Fig. 1. T-SNE visualization of penultimate layer activations of the model trained on
the OCT dataset [9]. The clean images are represented by solid circles with each color
represents a true class. The adversarial samples (triangles) are crafted by PGD with a
perturbation budget  = 0.005 where each color represents a predicted class. For each
class, UAD is capable of filtering out the OOD adversarial samples (center) and SSAT
enables the model to correctly predict in-distribution adversarial samples.
2 Proposed Model
The medical image classification problem is to train a prediction function fθ(·)
by minimizing the loss in mapping an clean image x ∈ X to its true label
y ∈ Y. Due to the existence of adversarial samples x′ ∈ X ′, it is necessary to
introduce a detection function gφ(·) that can distinguish whether an input of
fθ is perturbed by an adversary. Ideally gφ takes inputs from both X and X ′,
rejects all x′ from X ′, then fθ only takes x from X to make predictions. A
promising solution is to design a UAD function gφ to reject all OOD adversarial
samples from X ′. However, it is a challenging task since some of them (i.e., in-
distribution adversarial samples) are very close to clean images (Figure 1). As
such, a supervised prediction function fθ that is capable of correctly classifying
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Fig. 2. The proposed robust OCT imaging classification system equipped with SSAT
and UAD modules.
those adversarial samples using limited labeled training set is also indispensable
for maximizing the defense effectiveness.
Figure 2 illustrates our adversarial defense approach. During training (Figure
2a), we learn the robust feature representation via SSAT for both prediction and
UAD modules. During inference (Figure 2b), given an unseen test image (clean
or adversarial), the system extracts the feature as the input for UAD module.
The test image is rejected if it is detected as a OOD adversarial sample, otherwise
it continues to the loss layer to predict a class label. We describe the technical
detail of SSAT and UAD modules in the following subsections.
2.1 Semi-supervised Adversarial Training
Adversarial training (AT) [6] is a powerful way to improve the adversarial ro-
bustness of a prediction module when the labeled training set is abundant.
Recently adversarial samples generated from unlabeled data with pseudo la-
bels have been shown to be valuable for improving the adversarial robustness
[21]. In training the prediction module fθ with labeled images, we use the
supervised AT, i.e., Lsup(θ) = E
x∈X
supx′∈N(x) xent (y, fθ (x
′)) , where N(x)
denotes the neighborhood of a clean image x and ||x − x′||∞ < . The in-
ner maximization can be approximated by any available attack method, such
as PGD and FGSM. For training with unlabeled images, we first find their
pseudo labels yˆ(x) predicted by fθ, followed by AT, i.e., minimizing Lunsup (θ) =
E
x∈X ′
supx′∈N(x) xent (yˆ(x), fθ (x
′)) . We then minimize the loss function in Eq.
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1 to perform SSAT in an effort to enhance model’s adversarial robustness:
Lsemi-sup (θ) = Lsup (θ) + λLunsup (θ), (1)
where λ is a hyper-parameter tunned according to the relative abundances of
labeled and unlabeled training data [21].
2.2 Unsupervised Adversarial Detection
To filter out OOD adversarial samples x′ from being fed into fθ, we design an
UAD module gφ with the goal to exclude the majority of unseen adversarial
samples x′ ∈ X ′, and simultaneously prevent x ∈ X from being erroneously
rejected. As shown in Figure 1, the clean images have a different distribution
from adversarial samples classified into the same class (color). Inspired by this
observation, we estimate a probability density only for clean images as the UAD
module and reject images deviating away from this density as OOD adversar-
ial samples. Unlike the detection methods described in [11,12,4] our proposed
UAD is completely unsupervised that does not need to estimate the adversarial
density in whatever way thus is not limited to detecting the adversarial samples
from the known attack types. Specifically, let Z be the latent feature extracted
from the penultimate layer of fθ using x as input and we employ a Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) for UAD module gφ. Let µij ∈ Rn and Σij ∈ Rn×n
represents the mean and covariance matrix of the jth Gaussian component of
class i, respectively. For a single class, given all features extracted from clean
training samples Z = {z1, . . . ,zn}, we can estimate parameters of the GMM
using EM algorithm. The high dimension of Z may cause numerical issues dur-
ing training thus a small non-negative regularization is added to the diagonal of
the covariance matrices to alleviate these issues [16].
2.3 Adversarial Risk Evaluation
We propose a new adversarial risk evaluation measure for comparing systems
performance in terms of adversarial defense. We assess the risk derived from
clean images based on the following intuition: 1) a clean image incurs no risk if
it can be correctly classified, 2) a clean image being rejected by the UAD incurs
risk ruadcln , 3) a clean image being accepted by the UAD but misclassified by
prediction model incurs risk rprdcln . Assume that for clean images, the number of
accepted images that incorrectly predicted is N inccln (f, g), and the number of clean
images being rejected is Nrejcln (g), the risk derived from misclassifying (first term)
and erroneously rejecting (second term) clean images is calculated asRcln(f, g) =
N inccln (f, g) · rprdcln +Nrejcln (g) · ruadcln . If only f is used to make predictions (without
UAD), the second term is zeroed out. Lets denote N inccln (f) as the number of
clean images being misclassified by f , then the risk is calculated as Rcln(f) =
N inccln (f) · rprdcln .
Similarly for adversarial samples, we have the following intuition: 1) being
correctly rejected by UAD or bypassed but correctly classified incurs no risk,
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Fig. 3. An illustration of assessing systems adversarial risk. Note the system with UAD
on the right exhibits a much lower risk represented by smaller red zones.
2) being erroneously accepted by UAD but misclassified incurs a risk rprdadv. As-
sume the number adversarial samples in 2) is N incadv(f, g), the risk derived from
adversarial samples is calculated as Radv(f, g) = N
inc
adv(f, g) · rprdadv. When only
f is used to make predictions (without UAD), since N incadv(f, g) = N
inc
adv(f) and
N incadv(f) is the number of misclassified adversarial samples, the risk is calcu-
lated as Radv(f) = N
inc
adv(f) · rprdadv. The total risk, incurred by both clean and
adversarial samples, thus can be calculated by R = Rcln + Radv. The value of
different risks (ruadcln , r
prd
cln , r
prd
adv.) are determined empirically, then we have the risk
measures for AI systems with UAD R(f, g) and without UAD R(f) as follows:
R(f, g) = N inccln (f, g) +N
rej
cln (g) +N
inc
adv(f, g) (2)
R(f) = N inccln (f) +N
inc
adv(f). (3)
This evaluation measures are illustrated in Figure 3. Using the above equa-
tions, we can assess and compare average adversarial risks r = R(f, g)/N be-
tween UAD based and not UAD based adversarial defense approaches.
3 Experiments and Results
We use experiments to demonstrate that: 1): The SSAT module can significantly
increase model’s adversarial robustness without compromising classification per-
formance of clean images. 2) The UAD module can detect and exclude a majority
of successful adversarial examples. 3) Our medical imaging AI system (UAD +
SSAT) minimizes adversarial risk compared to other existing AI systems.
Dataset and Experiment Settings The experiments are conducted on a
public retinal OCT image dataset, originally released in [9]. It contains 84,495
images taken from 4,686 patients with 4 classes: choroidal neovascularization
(CNV), diabetic macular edema (DME), drusen, and normal. To demonstrate
the advantages of using unlabeled images for semi-supervised training (1), we
randomly sample 4,000 images for training, 1,000 images for testing and addi-
tional 1,000 images as the unlabeled dataset for SSAT. The 4 classes are bal-
anced in each data set. Following the standard prepossessing procedure [6], all
images are center-cropped to 224 × 224 and all pixels are scaled to [0,1]. For
AT and SSAT, we augment the data set by generating adversarial samples for
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each mini-batch using FGSM with a uniformly sampling perturbation from the
interval [0.001,0.003]. The number of adversarial and clean images remains 1 : 1
within each mini-batch. We use ResNet-18 [7] pre-trained with ImageNet to
learn robust feature representations against adversarial attacks. The networks
are trained with the SGD optimizer for 10 epochs with a batch size of 64. We
set λ = 5 for SSAT Eq. 1 as in [21].
SSAT Performance We evaluate class prediction performance under the most
challenging threat: ’white-box’ setting [1]. Compared to the benign ’black-box’
setting, the adversary possesses complete knowledge of the target model, in-
cluding architecture and model parameters. We compare our SSAT with three
baseline methods in terms of classification accuracy: natural training (NT) with
cross-entropy loss, adversarial training (AT) with cross-entropy loss [6] and nat-
ural training with guided complement entropy (GCE) loss [2]. The 1,000 attacks
are crafted by 1-step FGSM, 10-step PGD, and C&W based on the test set.
Fig. 4. The supervised prediction accuracy of the four trained models on 1000 adver-
sarial examples crafted by FGSM, PGD, C&W with an increasing perturbation budget
and constant c.
Figure 4 demonstrates that SSAT markedly outperforms other baselines in all
white-box attack settings while maintaining a comparable or better performance
on the clean image classification (when the perturbation budget is zero). The NT
appears very susceptible to easy attacks generated using FGSM with a very small
perturbation budget whereas GCE and AT demonstrate a solid performance
against easy attacks but fail under strong attacks such as those generated using
PGD and C&W. For AT, label scarcity has significantly limited its adversarial
generalizability. For GCE, widening the gap in the manifold between different
classes may not work well for medical images due to significant overlaps in both
the fore- and backgrounds.
UAD Performance We use features extracted from 4000 clean images in the
training set to estimate mixture model density for UAD. Then the 1000 images
from test set and its successful adversarial counterparts are used for assessing
performance of UAD. As shown in Table 1, UAD is more effective in detecting
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Classes CNV DME DRUSE NORMAL Average # cases
NT 0.897 0.802 0.852 0.859 0.852 885
GCE 0.943 0.902 0.930 0.931 0.927 970
AT 0.890 0.932 0.841 0.903 0.892 580
SSAT 0.965 0.987 0.967 0.974 0.973 136
Table 1. Performance comparison using AUPRC under PGD attack with a perturba-
tion  = 0.005. The last column shows the number of successful adversarial samples.
Method NT GCE AT SSAT SSAT*
Adversarial Risk w/o UAD 0.965 1.057 0.647 0.223 0.912
Adversarial Risk w. UAD 0.892 0.713 0.634 0.215 0.450
Prediction Accuracy 11.5% 0.3% 42% 86.4% 17.5%
Table 2. Systems risk under PGD attack with perturbation  = 0.005. SSTA* indicates
the risk under a stronger PGD attack  = 0.01.
and excluding adversarial samples evident by the higher AUPRC values among
all classes. Furthermore SSAT is more effective than other training strategies,
i.e., NT, AT or GCE. Since the classes of clean images and successful attacks
are highly imbalanced (136:1000), AUPRC is a suitable metric for performance
evaluation [20]. The average AUPRC value of 0.973 shows the proposed UAD
can correctly filter out a vast majority of OOD adversarial samples.
Comparison of Adversarial Risks Finally, we demonstrate that UAD com-
plementing with SSAT give rise to the lowest adversarial risk in terms of the new
measure proposed in Eq. 2&3. In Table 2, it is clear that UAD based systems
have consistently lower risks compared to those are not, regardless of the train-
ing methods used. Note that the reduction of risk is not significant for SSAT
against PGD attacks with a smaller budget ( = 0.005). The main reason is that
these adversarial samples are relatively weak (highest class prediction accuracy
of 86.4% in the last row) that SSAT can successful predict their labels without
the need for UAD. After we double the perturbation budget of PGD attack ( =
0.005), as shown in the last column, the adversarial risk decreases by half (from
0.912 to 0.450) with UAD, highlighting the striking robustness of our system
against stronger PGD attacks comparing with those without UAD.
4 Conclusions
We propose to enhance the robustness of medical image AI system via UAD
complemented with SSAT. The former is to imbue the system with robustness
against unseen OOD adversarial samples whereas the latter mitigate the la-
bel scarcity problem in training a robust classifier for predicting in-distribution
adversarial samples. Though experiments our system demonstrates a superior
performance in adversarial defense to competing techniques.
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